关于芜湖市融汇化工有限公司液氯泄露引发突发环境事件调查情况的报告

发布时间：2021-01-18 15:18信息来源： 芜湖市生态环境局

https://www.wuhu.gov.cn/openness/public/6596401/29879641.html

请选用符合压力等级认证 防爆等级认证 低泄漏认证 NACE耐腐材料的 装卸臂 

2020年8月29日17时28分许，位于芜湖市鸠江区境内的芜湖融汇化工有限公司液氯工段在对液氯槽车充装液氯过程中，发生氯气泄漏，造成相邻企业19人受伤住院、直接经济损失48万元。

事件发生经过

2020年8月29日14时驾驶员张建华、押运员张晓松从宁国久天化工驾驶徐州市天元恒盛工贸有限公司危化品运输车辆苏C57539（黄色）重型半挂牵引车牵引苏C597L挂（黄色）重型集装箱半挂车（两车道路运输证有效期至2021年4月）空车出发前往芜湖融汇化工有限公司进行液氯装运。

16时32分，液氯槽罐车到液氯工段槽罐车充装操作平台处，驾驶员张建华将车停稳后下车，去充装现场的临时办公桌前与当班操作人员进行充装前工作交流。

16时45分，驾驶员张建华完成充装平台万向节与槽罐车进口法兰的连接。

16时46分当班操作工胡昌群填写了《第一事业部液氯工段危险化学品车辆安全检查表》，当班班长何克云进行了确认签字。胡昌群完成发货前安全检查后填写了《第一事业部液氯工段槽车充装记录表》，当班班长何克云复核并签字。

16时48分，当班主操赵申龙接到指令开始充装。

17时28分13秒，液氯充装万向节破裂发生氯气泄漏，大量液氯从充装万向节断裂处（见图）向外泄漏，并向充装区南面（芜湖桑青生物科技有限公司及芜湖绿洲环保能源有限公司）扩散。现场操作班长何克云、操作工胡昌群以及驾驶员张建华和押运员见状立即向上风口处跑开。

美国化工安全机构 CSB 建议呼吁核证输氯软管

CSB Safety Advisory Calls for Validation of Chlorine Transfer Hoses

December 4, 2002

https://www.csb.gov/csb-safety-advisory-calls-for-validation-of-chlorine-transfer-hoses/

 (Washington, DC - December 4, 2002) Finding that the use of an incorrect hose led to an August 2002 chlorine leak near St. Louis, a new safety advisory issued today by the U.S. Chemical Safety Board (CSB) calls on other chlorine users to verify the materials of construction of their chlorine transfer hoses.

 (华盛顿，2002年12月4日) 美国化工安全机构CSB在发现使用非正确软管导致2002年8月圣路易斯附近氯气泄漏问题后，发布新的安全建议呼吁其他液氯用户确证各自使用的输氯软管的制作材质。

The advisory grows out of an August 14, 2002, chlorine release at DPC Enterprises in Festus, Missouri. In that incident, a transfer hose failed catastrophically during the unloading of a chlorine rail car. Due to the malfunction of an automatic shutdown system, the leak continued unabated for several hours, eventually causing the release of about 48,000 pounds of toxic chlorine gas. Sixty-three people, including workers and nearby residents, sought hospital treatment as the result of the leak.

此建议源自2002年8月14日密苏里州Festus，DPC企业发生的氯气泄漏事故。事故中，一根输氯软管在从铁路罐车卸载液氯时剧烈破裂。由于自动切断装置失效，泄漏毫无减弱地持续了几小时，最终导致约48,000磅剧毒氯气泄放。事故造成63人，包括工人及附近居民，送医救治。

Subsequent analysis showed that the transfer hose was constructed with braided stainless steel -- a material that is not recommended for chlorine service -- despite documentation from the hose distributor indicating that the hose was made of a chlorine-resistant alloy. The two kinds of braiding are visually indistinguishable. The hose that failed had evidently been degraded by the flow of chlorine, which is a strong corrosive, and had been in service for just 59 days when the failure occurred.

随后分析显示输运软管由不锈钢编网制作 – 不推荐用于液氯操作的材料 – 而软管经销商的文件却显示软管系由液氯耐蚀合金制作。两种编网目视无法区分。失效软管明显可见由强腐蚀的液氯流造成退化，失效发生时，仅使用了59天。

"Chlorine handlers should ensure that any nonmetallic-lined chlorine transfer hoses they use are constructed with the appropriate structural braiding layer, either PVDF monofilament or Hastelloy C-276," stated CSB lead investigator John Murphy, citing a recommended safety practice of the Chlorine Institute. "Nondestructive testing methods such as X-ray fluorescence can be used to positively differentiate between Hastelloy C-276, the intended material, and 316 L stainless steel, the use of which can lead to catastrophic hose failure."

 “液氯操作者应确保各自所使用的任何非金属材质内衬的输氯软管由合适的结构编网层制作，PVDF聚偏氟乙烯线纤或哈氏合金Hastelloy C-276”，CSB首席调查员John Murphy指出，并引述了北美氯业协会的安全操作建议。“无损检测方法，如X光荧光检测，可明确区分适用材料哈氏合金Hastelloy C-276，与使用即导致灾败的材料，316L不锈钢。”